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Abstract 
The authors introduce a pilot project on 
a general conflict warning system 
mainly designed to s m  the Swiss For- 
eign Ministry. Esp~cially after the 
Rwanda disaster, the administration 
(backed by the Foreign Committeeofthe 
Parliament) underlines the need for a 
computerized system that builds the 
groundfor early reco@zition and, thus, 
enhances the "institukionalized" pres- 
sure to (reluct in a stage ofa conflict as 
early as possible. Questions arise on the 
state of the art as well as on the interface 
between early warning on one hand and 
decision making and evprly action on the 
other. 
Les auteurs procMend h la desmption 
introductoire d'bn projet-pilote de prd- 
vention de conflit ghtralist visant 
principalement a desscirvir le Ministbe 
Suisse des Afiires &angbes. Parti- 
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I 
culi2rement apris la catastrophe du 
Rwanda, I'Administration (appuyde 
par le Comiti aux Afiires lhangbes 
du Parlement) met l'emphase sur la 
ntcessitt d'un s y s t h e  informatist 
jettant les bases d'une prmtdure de re- 
connaissance p r h t i v e ,  et de fait am- 
pli@ les pressions "institutionnelles" 
favorisant une (rt)action suntenant le 
plus tdt possible dans un conf2it don&. 
Des questions sont soulevdes concer- 
nant l'@t de mode relied cegenred'ini- 
tiative, et concernant l'interfkce entre 
l'alerte p r h t i v e  d'un c6tt et la prise 
de dtcision lit% h l'action rapide de 
l'autre. 
In this paper we introduce the frame- 
work and initial outline of a pilot 
project on an early warning system 
("FAST") designed to serve the Swiss 
Foreign Ministry. After the disaster of 
Rwanda (which affected a strongpoint 
of Swiss Development Cooperation) 
the Swiss Foreign Ministry, backed by 
the Foreign Affairs Committee of Par- 
liament, underlined the need for an 
early warning system. 
In view of disposing of an instru- 
ment for effective preventive 
diplomacy, enabling the Swiss ad- 
ministration to recognize and act 
upon a crisis as early as possible 
and at the same time enhancing the 
"institutionalized pressure" for 
such early decision making; 
in view also of the fact that-in 
~witzerland as well as other OECD 
state- ever increasing part of 
the available development aid is 
being consumed by disaster and 
costly post-conflict emergency re- 
quirements which could be consid- 
erably reduced by early preventive 
action. 
Three different sections of the Swiss 
Foreign Ministry (General Secretariat, 
Peace Policies and OSCE, Develop- 
ment Cooperation) are interested in an 
early warning system, that focuses on 
monitoring, analysis, planning and 
policy options in the framework of pre- 
ventive diplomacy. It is thus under- 
stood that the interface between early 
warning and early action and political 
decision making is as crucial as the 
overall design of an early warning sys- 
tem itself. 
The mandate that the Swiss Peace 
Foundation received for drafting the 
pilot project contains the following 
major requests: 
to "explore the preconditions, the 
efficiency and the costs of FAST 
(German abbreviation for: "Early 
Recognition of Tensions and Fact 
Finding") as an instrument to pre- 
pare decisions in preventive diplo- 
macy;" 
to provide an overview of existing 
capacities and services in the field 
of early warning; 
to explore possible cooperation 
with existing institutions in this 
field; 
to formulate proposals concerning 
an adequate set of early warning 
indicators; 
to evaluate software packages, net- 
works, WWW-based systems, etc. 
for the purpose of structuring an 
early warning system; 
to design a minimal capacity con- 
cept for FAST in the framework of 
an early waming system; and 
to define the necessary manpower 
and financial requirements, like 
profile of staff members, size of 
permanent staff, annual costs (mi- 
nimal requests) and other institu- 
tional aspects. 
An effective early warning system is 
a part of and a precondition for effec- 
tive preventive diplomacy, defined in 
the narrower sense of crisis avoidance 
or pre-conflict prevention rather than 
in the more general terms of in-conflict 
or post-conflict crisis management. 
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Any attempt to set up and implement 
an early warning mechanism for the 
Swiss Foreign Ministry has therefore 
to take into account the inherent im- 
pediments that tend to slow down or 
exclude preventive diplomatic action. 
At the UN Conference on "Preven- 
tive Diplomacy: The Therapeutics of 
Mediation" (April 23-24, 1996, New 
York) some of the major problems con- 
cerning effective crisis prevention 
were addressed: 
1. Lack of political will-+ crisis that 
has not yet erupted is not generat- 
ing either the pressures or the even- 
tual rewards politicians normally 
need before making decisions and 
taking action. The absence of actual 
crisis visibility via media and TV 
("CNN-factor") tends to reduce the 
sense of urgency needed for politi- 
cal decision makers. A still hidden 
crisis weakens the incentive for 
politicians and executive agencies 
to engage substantial financial, eco- 
nomic or even military resources in 
crisis avoidance. Last but not least, 
a still hidden crisis hampers the 
political will for either unilateral or 
multilateral action in preventive 
diplomacy, which in addition and 
as a rule, demands more patience 
than politicians are able to mobi- 
lize. 
2. The sovereignty dilemma-pre- 
ventive diplomacy to avoid the out- 
break of an intrastate crisis often 
leads to intervention for and inter- 
national solidarity with people in 
need. As such it can easily get into 
conflict with the principle of state 
sovereignty, which the interna- 
tional community is also bound to 
respect and protect. This tension 
between two conflicting goals in 
international affairs is an addi- 
tional factor to considerably slow- 
down effective preventive action; 
as UN-Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali stated in his address 
at the above mentioned UN Con- 
ference: 
Failure to take effective preventive 
action is only rarely due to lack of 
early warning; the symptoms are 
usually there for all to see. What is 
too often lacking at present is a pre- 
disposition by the parties to accept 
third party assistance in resolving 
their dispute. Ways have to be 
found to persuade them, without 
infringing their sovereignty or 
other rights, that it is in their own 
interest to accept the help of the UN 
and other international players, 
rather than to allow their dispute to 
turn into armed conflict. 
3. The limits of traditional diplo- 
macy-traditional diplomacy 
tends to secretive procedures, to 
interest of the barties inv lved and 
of encouragihg them t  refrain 
from violent conflict. What is 
needed is a well-coordinated and 
fine-tuned mix of political, eco- 
nomic, social, developmental and 
eventually military measures to 
avoid conflict eruption and facili- 
tate crisis management. Such a mix 
however requires mental readiness 
to accept division of labour, 
interdependence and crossfeeding 
between very often competing 
Any effective early warning system has to be directed to mobilize 
the political will for early action; that is for early decisions on 
concrete effective steps to get preventive diplomacy moving. Early 
warning systems must, hence, consider the practical problems 
and dilemmas of preventive diplomacy in view of overcoming 
them and facilitating the task of the executive agencies and 
governmental decision makers. 
problem and tension avoidance, to 
business as usual, to keep smiling 
and appeasement. It concentrates 
not only on quiet but also on silent 
diplomacy. Effective preventive 
diplomacy on the other hand can 
never be silent; it must address the 
critical issues directly, go to the 
roots of the conflict, use confidenti- 
ality as well as transparency and 
publicity to sound such credible 
alarm as to make crisis prevention 
work. Effective prevention has to 
do with leverage and deterrence; it 
is usually an edgy, not a smooth 
operation; it is the very opposite of 
appeasement. 
4. There are rare cases like the one in 
1995 in Burundi, where the US am- 
bassador had the exceptional cour- 
age to personally organize a 
preventive press conference in or- 
der to make public some of the most 
barbarous atrocities that were go- 
ing on in that country day by day 
and for which he held the Burundi 
government responsible. 
5. The bureaucracy block--effective 
preventive diplomacy requires a 
balanced blend of incentives and 
disincentives with the aim of ap- 
pealing to the enlightened self- 
ministries and departments in na- 
tional administrations as well as 
between different governments, 
international organizations and 
INGO's. Deblocking bureaucratic 
obstinacies and rivalries or just 
streamlining overly complicated 
administrative procedures is there- 
fore one of the major challenges 
which preventive diplomacy and 
its early warrting instruments have 
to cope with. 
Any effective early warning system 
has to be directed to mobilize the po- 
litical will for early action; that is for 
early decisions on concrete effective 
steps to get preventive diplomacy 
moving. Early warning systems must, 
hence, consider the practical problems 
and dilemmas of preventive diplo- 
macy in view of overcoming them and 
facilitating the task of the executive 
agencies and governmental decision 
makers. 
These considerations have been 
very much on our mind regarding out- 
line and leading criteria of our early 
warning project (FAST) for the Swiss 
MFA. The following elements for es- 
tablishing an early warning system as 
mandated by theSwiss MFA seem cru- 
cial to us: 
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FAST has to be a system which can 
become functional and operational 
on a rather short term basis and at 
the same time be a system based on 
(computerized) early warning 
models and indicator clusters 
which lend themselves to constant 
refinement and adjustments; FAST 
is meant to be a scientifically devel- 
oped instrument to be of immedi- 
ate use to political practitioners and 
decision makers, not an academic 
exercise for professorial experi- 
menting and speculation. 
FAST has to be a system of multi- 
departmental, multipurpose and 
multidirectional nature; the data 
and information to be monitored 
and the geographical areas to be 
covered have to satisfy the early 
warning requirements of different 
agencies in the MFA: on the one 
hand, the more globally-oriented 
political department, looking after 
Swiss interests worldwide (trade, 
investments, migration, terrorism, 
proliferation, etc.) and concen- 
trating on the 53 OSCE states, 
especially the transition of ex-com- 
munist countries to democratic 
civil societies; on the other hand, 
the more narrow and third-world- 
focused development cooperation 
agency, concentrating on some 16 
focal countries with major foreign 
aid projects. 
FAST has to be an early warning 
chain-system going all the way 
from monitoring, collection and 
dissemination of information, up to 
analysis, evaluation, risk-assess- 
ment and finally presentation of 
policy options and scenarios cred- 
ible enough to convince policyrnak- 
ers about the need for early action; 
it should be conceived as a bridge 
between crisis theatre and crisis 
management; it should be elabo- 
rated as a "pipelinem- or "flow 
chart"-system, in order to enhance 
institutionalized pressures, chan- 
nel political decision making and 
thus prepare the ground for early 
preventive action. 
FASThas tobe anchored and estab- 
lished outside the executive and 
administrative structures of the 
Foreign Ministry; yet, it still has to 
work and function in close collabo- 
ration and feedback-relation with 
authorized persons and staff from 
within the Ministry; the Swiss 
Peace Foundation, which has been 
mandated to work out the pilot 
project, could eventually very well 
be entrusted with the actual imple- 
mentation, organization and daily 
management of the FAST-early 
warning system. 
FAST should be structured and 
equipped so as to monitor and col- 
lect different levels and types of 
data, based on the fact, that crisis- 
and violence-breeding conflicts are 
dynamic processes, rooted in his- 
tory and evolving in escalating or 
de-escalating phases: (1) back- 
ground conditions of a crisis (his- 
torical, economic and social roots of 
the conflict, power and ethnic struc- 
tures, cultural/civilizational par- 
ticularities, etc.,); (2) intervening 
conditions (power struggle within 
the political leadership, increasing 
discrimination of certain social 
strata, etc.); (3) so called "accelera- 
tors" (repressive measures by the 
regime, violent incidents, sanc- 
tions, threats of international inter- 
vention, etc.) that change thenature 
of the crisis and propel it into a new, 
more or less violent phase. 
We would like to list here some of 
the practical questions, which we are 
facing in our layout for the FAST-early 
warning pilot project on behalf of the 
Swiss Foreign Ministry. For some of 
these questions, the academic and re- 
sear* community might have at least 
partial answers already available; oth- 
ers will have to wait for the trial and 
error test of practical experience: 
Should FASTbe built on global data 
base or should it be more focus ori- 
ented, that is restricted to focal 
points and countries of interest? 
What are the advantages and dis- 
advantages of each one of these two 
approaches? 
What models do already exist to 
satisfy the multidepartmental and 
multidirectional needs of FAST, 
which has to provide three differ- 
ent sections of the Swiss MFA with 
an early warning instrument? 
Should FAST in its static part pro- 
vide data (on-line) on a permanent 
basis or will periodical reporting be 
enough? Can the two concepts be, 
mixed? 
Should FAST be totally or over- 
whelmingly Swiss and self-made or 
should it plug into existing early 
warning networks that also work 
for other governmental customers? 
To what extent can non-Swiss early 
warning capacities be explored and 
utilized? 
Should FAST be open to all sources 
of information or should the early 
warning source material be col- 
lected on a selective basis? How 
and by which criteria should this 
selection be implemented? 
How should the out-of-govern- 
ment early warning center of FAST 
connect with the in-government 
structures of the Foreign Ministry? 
Is a special institutional link re- 
quired or will case by case contacts 
do? 
What are the manpower require- 
ments of such an out-of-govern- 
ment early warning center? What 
kind of specialists are needed for 
FAST on a permanent or a tempo- 
rary basis? 
How much ground in the direction 
of political decision making should 
FAST cover without overloading 
and overcommitting itself? Should 
for instance the presentation of 
policy options in a given crisis be 
part of the early warning chain of 
FAST? 
The setting-up of an early warning 
system like FAST provides fascinating 
insight into the interdependent worlds 
of international politics on the one 
hand and international science and re- 
search on the other. Doers and thinkers 
blend in intimate interaction. They are 
bound to coordinate and integrate 
their efforts, since early warning ef- 
forts without the thinkers will develop 
no roots and without the doers will 
bear no fruits. 
